What makes promoting innovation in a cluster different from
promoting innovation elsewhere? The answer is straightforward: Apart
from all the things one can do everywhere, in a cluster there is the
option to activate the potential of innovation based on
"collective efficiency", something that is no option in
other locations.
I have argued above that promoting innovation in a cluster which
does not have a tradition of co-operation, where local actors find the
idea of "collective efficiency" implausible, involves two
different kinds of innovation: not only technological innovation but
also social innovation. The social innovation of transforming a
non-cooperative into a cooperation-minded setting is not necessarily a
precondition for initiatives to promote technological innovation. But
increasing the propensity to co-operate is both in itself an important
measure to unleash innovative potential and a precondition to increase
the leverage of other measures. How, then, is it possible to increase
the propensity to co-operate in the three areas outlined above?
Regarding inter-firm co-operation, I have found that such
initiatives are most likely to succeed which meet four criteria:
- they address immediate problems of firms,
- they do not touch what firms perceive as their core activities,
- they open little or no latitude for predatory behavior,
- they offer the potential of savings through economies of scale.
Let me explain these criteria by briefly outlining typical
activities which do not meet them and usually fail. First, there is
technological co-operation, such as the joint development of a new
production process. In such a case, participating firms fear that
other firms get to know pieces of information which they perceive as
essential to their competitiveness. Accordingly, they put pressure on
their technicians not to unveil any possibly critical information,
what in effect means that it is unlikely that the co-operation project
gets anywhere. Firms may also choose their less competent technicians
to take part in the project, something that also does not enhance the
probability of success. Second, when one mentions the option of
co-operation, businesspeople in a non-cooperative cluster typical come
up first of all with ideas which effectively are anti-competitive,
such as forming a purchasing co-operative. However, if firms do not
trust each other, a supplier who is the target of the co-operative
will easily break it by offering preferential purchasing conditions to
one or some of the participating firms.
What then are activities which meet the four criteria? Research in
clusters in the state of Santa Catarina, Brazil, found three types of
activities:
- Training. Even though surprisingly many firms opted for in-house
training (even when it came to basic education for semi-literate
employees), there were numerous examples of joint training
activities. The economies of scale are obvious, the benefits as
well, there is little option for predatory behavior, and the
training is limited to areas which do not touch upon the core
activities.
- Environment-related activities. In this area co-operation
between firms involved a level of exchange of information between
firms which was unthinkable in areas such as quality management or
technological development. Apart from being due to the fact that
firms, initially mostly sticking to end-of-pipe-solutions,
perceived environmental protection literally as a peripheral
activity, the fact that there was the government environmental
agency as an external enemy also created an incentive to stick
together.
- Basic testing activities. In the textiles industry this refers
to testing cotton fibers and chemical inputs, in the ceramic tile
industry to testing the clay. In fact, in the ceramic tile cluster
around Criciúma, which is the leading cluster in the industry in
Latin America, it was after a major crisis in the early 1990s that
firms lobbied their business association and state government to
create a technology center which had testing as one of its main
activities. The crisis forced firms to look out for potentials to
save costs. Before that, each firm had its own underutilised
laboratory.
Looking at the evolution of the clusters in Santa Catarina, it is
possible to perceive that initiatives like those just mentioned may
pave the way for more ambitious co-operation activities. As firms see
that co-operation creates advantages, they may develop a certain
degree of trust which permits other, more ambitious and risky
co-operation activities, such as exchange of technological
information. However, there is by no means a clear trajectory in this
respect. The experience of the tile cluster in Criciúma, Brazil, is
somewhat sobering: After a massive joint effort to deal with the
crisis achieved most of its declared goals by the mid-1990s, the
degree of co-operation has been decreasing again. Whereas four years
ago several of the local actors saw their cluster on track to emulate
the experience of Italian industrial districts, today one can sense a
certain frustration which may be due to the fact that maintaining
co-operation is quite an effort.
Regarding co-operation between firms and institutions, it is
useful to distinguish two issues. First, there are business
associations. In Brazil, like elsewhere in Latin America, business
associations tend to be relative weak, with few employees and a low
level of competence, especially when it comes to providing member
firms with real services. Organisational development in such
associations is a lengthy but unavoidable activity. Regarding the case
of Santa Catarina, there was a German technical assistance project
which after five years of hard work was quite successful. The
methodology it had developed was first extended to other parts of the
state and recently to other parts of the country, with financial and
organisational support of the parastatal SME support organisation
SEBRAE.
Second, there are institutions such as training and technology
institutes. In the past, such institutions in Brazil tended to operate
in a kind of vacuum and were highly auto-referential. In the import
substitution era, i.e. until 1990, technology institutes found little
demand from the private sector which was under little pressure to
innovate in a not very competitive market. Training institutes
encountered an environment which was marked by massive skills
shortages so that whatever training they provided was gladly accepted
by the private sector. Even though a large part of the vocational
training system was administrated by the private sector itself the
possibilities of firms articulating their specific demands vis-à-vis
the training institutes were often very limited. With a new, more
competitive environment, institutions have to face tough challenges.
In order to get a better understanding regarding how to make
supporting institutions more responsive to private sector demand, it
is useful to use a concept that has been implicit in much of the
restructuring which took place in firms in the 1990s. Figure 1
summarises four key goals of organisational development: efficiency,
quality (in the sense of minimizing the cost of quality management),
flexibility (i.e. the ability to satisfy a wide scope of
differentiated demand), and responsiveness (i.e. the ability to
respond quickly to demand).
In the old days, optimizing the factors mentioned in Figure 1
involved trade-offs. Increasing flexibility often went to the
detriment of efficiency, responsiveness went to the detriment of
quality, and so forth. In the management field, the analysis of
Japanese organisational methods provided crucial insights in terms of
overcoming these trade-offs. It was the main contribution of the
Toyota production system to show industrial managers how to optimize
all four factors at the same time. An analysis of the world car
industry provided both managers and researchers with the relevant
benchmarks.
Four dimensions of organisational
development
<grafik>
There is no reason why this idea should not be applicable to
supporting institutions in fields such as education, training, and
technology. Sure, it will often involve major upheaval in
organisations which so far had a single-minded rationale, e.g.
academic excellence. But getting to a balance between different
rationales is exactly the point of organisational development.
Co-operation between the private and the public sector puts
high demands on both sides. On the side of the private sector, it is,
first and foremost, essential to have effective organisations. Large
firms can interact with government, especially local government, on an
individual basis. Small and medium-sised firms will find this
difficult. They will have to unite their voices to be heard; this
leads us back to the issues mentioned before in terms of creating
effective business associations.
On the side of the public sector, the first issue is that it has to
take an active interest in the fate of the private sector. This is
much less obvious than might be expected. In Brazil, I have found that
local government often did not care about private business, except as
a source of revenue. First, private businesses had been growing for
decades without support from local government, and second, there had
been all sorts of policies from central and state government so that
local government developed a disposition to wait for their action
rather than acting on its own.
The second issue is that government, before starting cluster
initiatives, ought to get its own house in order. Government at all
levels tends to erect all sorts of obstacles for private business –
some of them essential and in fact important to stimulate
competitiveness, such as environmental regulation and consumer
protection, but many of them either inefficient or altogether not very
sensible. Reviewing regulation, removing those obstacles which are not
essential, and reorganizing what remains is the most important task
for government. In practical terms this means different things at
different levels, such as moving from command & control to
economic instruments for environmental policy at the national level,
streamlining regulations at all levels, or creating one-stop or
first-stop-agencies at the local level.
Only after addressing the obstacles it has created for the private
sector does government have the credibility to get involved in
meaningful private sector promotion activities, such as a cluster
initiative. Government agencies at the local or regional level can
play two important roles in this respect. First, they can act as
moderators, mediators, and facilitators, i.e. provided they have
competence and credibility they may play a crucial role in overcoming
mistrust among firms. Second, they may cover part of the transaction
costs any co-operative venture incurs. In this respect, the
justification is pretty much the same as in terms of government
support for R&D. In a microeconomic perspective the costs of
co-operation will often be substantial whereas the benefits are
hypothetical, and the appropriability may appear dubious. Therefore,
firms will tend to underinvest in co-operation.
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