A case study of a successful Projeto Marketing
Municipal: Mafra
Mafra is a Brazilian city of about 50,000 inhabitants which is
located at the border between SC and Paraná, where it has a twin city,
Rio Negro with about 35,000 inhabitants. Even though only a third of
Mafra’s population is living outside the boundaries of the urban
parameter, it is basically a rural place. Mafra’s industry is
resource-based - sawmills, furniture and other wood products, brick
manufacturing; the only apparently "modern" firm is a ceramic
tile manufacturer whose performance indicators, however, are below those
of competitors elsewhere in SC. Mafra has got a somewhat stronger
profile in services (especially wholesale and retail trade, medical
services, and education) as it is the center of a micro-region
encompassing a number of smaller towns. Per-capita-GDP was about R$
4,800 in 1995 (at that time, the Real had about at 1:1 parity with the
Dollar), i.e. 20 % below the average of SC.
Economic promotion activities started in the mid-1990s. In 1996 local
government succeeded in attracting a factory of an U.S.-firm which will
employ 85 employees at its final stage. The firm is producing surface
replacements for truck tires, using a high-tech process. There were no
subsequent investments, but this experience created a consciousness
regarding the possibilities of local activities. In 1997, a new mayor
entered office who picked the former president of the local chamber (ACIM)
as secretary for economic development. Both participated in 1997 in a
seminar on concepts and instruments of local economic promotion
organized by Fundação Empreender (FE). In 1998, ACI and city
government invited FE to support the elaboration of an economic
development strategy, called "Projeto Marketing Municipal".
The proposal of the FE consultants was to conduct a quick appraisal of
competitive advantages and disadvantages.
The appraisal exercise was conducted in September 1998 by two FE
consultants, accompanied by the executive secretary of ACIM. The main
findings were
- relatively weak structure of industry, overall mediocre
competitiveness of industrial firms, but some potential in trade and
agriculture;
- an adequate structure of support institutions, especially
regarding education and vocational training, a highly competent
agricultural extension NGO (BNAF), two credit cooperatives for
agricultural development with some potential, and a very high
credibility of ACIM;
- a critical financial condition of the city government;
- a strong commitment of local leaders and organizations to get
involved in economic promotion as a result of a sense of a looming
crisis, plus a strong commitment to collaboration between
organizations and associations.
The proposals of the FE consultants included conceptual issues and
concrete suggestions. Regarding conceptual proposals, the consultants
tried to convince local actors that the main approach to local economic
development should be to mobilize existing potentials (rather than
trying to create from scratch some structures in areas which appear to
hold a lot of potential, like conference tourism where Mafra so far has
next to nothing to offer). They also tried to get across the message
that economic promotion should be about creating a difference, a
specific local profile which cannot easily be replicated elsewhere, a
profile which creates a localized competitive advantage. Concrete
suggestions included connecting local agriculture with local trade,
strengthening existing industries (for instance by launching energy
efficiency programs), and developing a difference in the area of
tourism. The subsequent activities of ACIM focused mainly on
agriculture/trade, tourism, and energy (Santa Catarina is being
connected to the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline for natural gas, and it is
crucial for the region of Mafra with its energy-intensive resource-based
industries to get connected).
Linkages between local agriculture and local trade
Activities in this respect built on the existing initiatives of BNAF,
which had gone on for two years and so far had gone more or less
unnoticed by other local actors. The work format of BNAF was based on a
new concept of associativism. BNAF encouraged smallholders to form
associations with about ten members, each initially focusing on just one
product. Each association is accompanied by BNAF’s consultants. Each
smallholder who wants to enter an association is obliged to pass through
a week of training at EPAGRI, a government agricultural research and
advisory agency. At the beginning, the main product was tomatoes which
were grown in simple, cheap greenhouses (consisting of a wooden frame
covered with robust transparent plastic). Subsequently, new products
were introduced, including some cultures for greenhouse cultures
(zucchini, cucumbers, melons, and strawberries) as well as other
products (milk, honey, beans, snails, and rabbits). BNAF receives a
small amount of government subsidies and is otherwise reliant on
financial support from its target group, i.e. families owning small
properties. It is scanning worldwide experiences in agricultural
innovation; BNAF consultants have paid visits to Israel, France, China,
and Mexico to get first-hand information on new techniques. In September
1999, BNAF gave assistance to 800 smallholders in Mafra as well as
neighboring towns, with more families waiting to be integrated.
The cooperation between BNAF and ACIM involved two aspects: linking
BNAF and its clientele with local trade, and conflict resolution.
Linking local small producers with local trade was no easy task. Local
supermarkets had tried to purchase vegetables from local producers
before, but this had failed due to unreliable and predatory behavior of
the producers. Ever since local producers had sold their products to
wholesale traders in Curitiba (two hours away from Mafra), and
supermarkets had purchased fruit and vegetable there. Convincing the
supermarket owners to give it another try with local producers, this
time with the intermediation of ACIM and BNAF, involved intense
persuasion by the executive secretary of ACIM. Initially, it involved
only tomatoes (with everybody being better off - producer prices were 31
% higher, purchasing prices for supermarkets 22 % lower, and the
consumer price dropped by 15 %), subsequently being expanded to other
products. Local marketing of milk involved one association investing in
equipment to sterilize and package the milk. Producer prices rose from
R$ 0,16 to R$ 0,41, with the producers still selling it at a much lower
price than large firms. It happened thus that the association won a bid
to supply local schools against large competitors like Parmalat.
An unexpected effect of the link between producers and trade, and of
the trust which quickly built between BNAF and ACIM, was that local
trade firms started to deposit money at one of the local credit
cooperatives which is working closely together with BNAF. Initially,
this involved an amount of about R$ 600,000, which by September 1999 had
grown to more than R$ 4 million and then also involved the other credit
cooperative. While in September 1998 BNAF had various projects in the
drawer and was desperately, and with little success, looking for funds,
today the situation has reversed - BNAF has to work hard to put all the
money at productive use.
Conflict resolution by ACIM so far involved two cases which might
have blown the whole experience. First, BNAF had come up with the idea
to organize joint purchases of all the affiliated smallholders. It
turned out that the best way of organizing this was to organize an open
auction, with the suppliers bidding against each other until the lowest
acceptable price for various inputs was reached. The suppliers reacted
by asking ACIM for support in forming a cartel to deal with BNAF. It
took the executive secretary of ACIM several meetings to dissuade the
suppliers from proceeding with this scheme, mainly by pointing out the
fact that local agriculture is going through a period of crisis (since
traditional cultures are becoming less productive and earning lower
prices, while interest rates have been raised to extremely high levels
during the last three years), and that is was in the long-term interest
of suppliers to strengthen local producers.
Second, apparently one of the representatives of a large milk
producer bribed a health inspector of the city government to classify
the milk produced by the association as hazardous. The inspector
inspected the association’s installations at ten o’clock in the
morning, and by 3 p.m. came up with the incriminating exam. The
manipulation was immediately obvious since the next laboratory is
located in Curitiba; it was technically impossible to have an exam in
hands within such short time. The association alerted ACIM, which
immediately called for a meeting. It was decided to send a sample to
Curitiba for an examination, and ACIM was to call the local newspapers
immediately to alert them of the inspector’s fraud. This worked just
fine - the real exam arrived the next day, showing that the milk was
just fine; the newspapers published this result, thus reinforcing the
standing of the local producer; and ACIM successfully lobbied with the
mayor to have the corrupt inspector fired.
Tourism and paleontology
In terms of tourism, Mafra has a lot of potential - a nice landscape,
beautiful waterfalls, extensive forests, and so forth. However, this is
no particular advantage since all the municipalities in the region have
such a potential. The difference between Mafra and neighboring cities is
the fact that Mafra has a number of important paleontological sites,
which are not just normal sites but actually prove the hypothesis that
millions of years ago Africa and America were a single continent. These
sites have been known since the 1930s, but they have never been
systematically explored or exploited. The existence of these sites came
back to the memories of many local actors when such a site was uncovered
during the earth-moving for the construction of the plant of the U.S.
firm mentioned before, with an immediate intervention of federal
authorities and an acute risk that the firm would cancel its investment.
It was through swift action of several local actors that the findings
could be secured in the local university, and construction could
proceed.
Leveraging the paleontological sites to attract tourists was one of
the suggestions of the Projeto Marketing Municipal. Local actors liked
this idea, and ACIM convened a working group of representatives of
several organizations, not only from Mafra but also from neighboring Rio
Negro, to elaborate a project (among them a retired professor, an
internationally renowned specialist in the field). The project which
evolved was quite ambitious: Create a National Center for Paleontology,
not just for tourism but also as a research center, especially catering
to visiting researchers and groups of students from Brazil and abroad.
It also took not long to find the ideal place: a big and very beautiful
building in Rio Negro, constructed as a Franciscan seminar at the
beginning of the century, abandoned since the 1970s and recently
partially renovated.
It took some time to overcome short-sighted rivalries and jealousies
between Mafra and Rio Negro to get the project moving. A big step
forward took place in August 1999 when the working group, together with
representatives from the two city governments and city councils, defined
six separate elements which together make up the whole project, which
are to be divided evenly between Mafra and Rio Negro. In September, a
memorandum of understanding was signed by the two mayors, the two
presidents of the city councils, and the two presidents of ACIs. Three
persons were identified who will work full-time for the project - one
paid by the city of Mafra, another one by the city of Rio Negro, and the
third one by both the state governments of Santa Catarina and Paraná.
In terms of Brazil, such a project involving two cities from two
different states is very unusual and a big achievement.
The direct economic effect has been estimated at R$ 5 million per
year. However, this calculation was based on very restrictive
assumptions, and counted tourism income only. It is quite likely that
the direct and indirect effect of the project, once it will be up and
running (probably early 2000), will be more substantial. Apart from
that, it will raise a lot of attention for Mafra, which so far is
perceived as a relatively unimportant backwater, and it will enforce the
self-esteem of local actors in Mafra and Rio Negro, thus creating
favorable conditions for further projects.
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